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State and Local Enforcement of the Criminal
Immigration Statutes and the
Preemption Doctrine
I.

INTRODUCTION

Responding to concern that the Immigration and Naturalization
Act (INA) was doing little to restrain escalating illegal immigration,,
Congress passed the controversial Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) in 1986.2 The Act employs a three-tiered scheme of civil

and criminal sanctions designed to discourage illegal immigration
while rewarding legal immigration.' Its most innovative, and hotly
debated, element imposes penalties on employers who hire undocumented aliens.4 Also controversial is the IRCA's grant of amnesty to
specific classes of undocumented aliens currently residing in the
1. See H.R.

REP.

No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE

CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649. Congress amended the Immigration and Naturalization Act

(INA) in 1965, overturning the national origin quotas contained in the original 1952 Act and,
for the first time, imposing a limit on legal entry from countries in the Western Hemisphere.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982). The 1965 amendments also established a system of "preference
categories" controlling the issuance of entry visas. A substantial increase in illegal
immigration followed these amendments, and since the 1970's, illegal immigration has swelled
to alarming rates. See D. NORTH, ENFORCING THE IMMIGRATION LAW: A REVIEW OF
OPTIONS iii (1980); S. PEDRAZA & L. BAILEY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MIGRANTS IN

AMERICA 69-75 (1985). Senator Alan K. Simpson, who spearheaded efforts to push the
immigration reform bill through Congress, warned that "uncontrolled immigration is one of
the greatest threats to the future of this country." Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1985, at 33, col. 4. A
number of politicians echoed similar sentiments during the debate over immigration reform.
For an informative comment on the politics of the immigration reform movement, see Fallows,
Immigration: How It Is Affecting Us, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1983, at 55.

2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IRCA].
3. Although the Act contains other new features, such as state verification of the
immigration status of aliens applying for government benefits and a distinct temporary
agricultural worker program, IRCA §§ 121, 301, it relies primarily on employer sanctions,
legalization, and increased enforcement resources to control illegal immigration. See infra
notes 4-7; see also H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 1, at 46 ("This legislation seeks to close the
back door on illegal immigration so that the front door on legal immigration may remain
open.").
4. See IRCA § 274A. This section makes it unlawful to knowingly hire or continue to
employ unauthorized aliens. Section 274A(f) contains criminal penalties for employers who
engage in a "pattern or practice of violations of subsection (a)(1)(A) or (a)(2)." IRCA
§ 274A(f)(1). Because the IRCA, like the INA, is silent on the issue, the employer penalty
section raises the same questions regarding state and local enforcement as those raised by the
illegal entry provisions of the INA. See infra note 76.
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United States. 5 Immigration reform advocates faced few battles, however, over the Act's third element: enforcement. Congress merely
amended the enforcement provisions of the INA by tightening loopholes in the alien smuggling statute6 and providing increased
resources for Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) enforcement efforts.7
The enforcement element of the INA is comprised of civil deportation and interrelated criminal statutes. Although the INS typically
processes undocumented aliens under the civil INA provisions, it has
the alternative of criminal proceedings in many cases." Aliens who
enter the country without INS inspection, for example, are both
civilly deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 12519 and subject to criminal
charges under 8 U.S.C. § 1325.10 Aliens deported for illegal entry
5. See IRCA §§ 201-204.
6. See H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 1, at 65, 66; see also IRCA § 112 (amending 8
U.S.C. § 1324 (1982)).
7. IRCA § 111. Congress deemed increased enforcement an essential element of the
program for immigration reform. See H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 1, at 63. Although
budget allocations in the past have left the INS undermanned and overwhelmed by its task, the
Reagan administration's budget proposal for the fiscal year 1988 contains major increases for
the INS. See 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 25 (1987). If Congress approves the Reagan budget
request, the INS will become a billion dollar a year agency in 1988. Id.
8. See Harwood, Arrests Without Warrant: The Legal and OrganizationalEnvironment
of Immigration Law Enforcement, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 505, 511 (1984). As Professor
Harwood points out, the INA's civil and criminal provisions overlap considerably. See id. at
511-12. An alien who "enters without inspection," for example, is subject to either section
1251 civil deportation or section 1325 criminal penalties. See infra notes 9-13. Nevertheless,
the vast majority of violators are processed in civil rather than criminal proceedings, and
Professor Harwood reports that the INS in 1982 officially deported less than three percent of
all apprehended aliens. (The INS unofficially deported the remainder). Harwood, supra, at
511-12. Because the likelihood of criminal prosecution is so small, local police who apprehend
an alien suspected of entry without inspection are in substance enforcing civil deportation
provisions of the INA in addition to the criminal provisions that they are authorized to
enforce. See infra note 15.
9. Title 8, section 1251 of the United States Code specifies a number of conditions under
which the INS can civilly deport noncitizens. Aliens who enter the country legally but
subsequently violate the terms of their visas, for example, are illegally present under section
1251 and subject to deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9) (1982). Similarly, aliens who "enter
without inspection" are subject to expulsion under section 1251(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2)
(1982).
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982). Section 1325 provides:
Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by
immigration officers, or (3) obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false

or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall,
for the first commission of any such offenses, be guilty of a misdemeanor and

upon conviction thereof be punished by imprisonment for not more than six
months, or by a fine of not more than $500, or by both, and for a subsequent
commission of any such offenses shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
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who again enter the country illegally commit a felony." The IRCA
left these sections of the INA untouched but amended a third criminal statute, the harboring and smuggling provision. 2 The IRCA

additionally contains criminal penalties for employers who make a

"pattern or practice" of hiring undocumented aliens. 3 Both Acts
require the services of the INS, a federal agency exclusively devoted

4
to enforcement of the federal immigration laws. 1
But the INS is not alone in apprehending illegal aliens. State

statutes grant local police the authority to arrest individuals who violate federal criminal law, including the criminal immigration statutes. 5 Courts upholding state enforcement have stated that, in the
thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by a
fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982). Section 1326 provides that any alien who:
(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, and
thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States,
unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or his
application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney
General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; or (B)
with respect to any alien previously excluded and deported, unless such respect
to an alien previously excluded and deported, unless such alien shall establish
that he was not required to obtain such advance consent under this chapter or
any prior Act, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, be
punished by imprisonment of not more than two years, or by a fine of not more
than $1,000, or both.
12. See IRCA §§ 111-112 (amending 8 U.S.C. 1324 (1982)). Under the harboring statute,
the INS can charge with a felony any person, regardless of citizenship, who knowingly or
recklessly transports an alien within the country, assists an alien in illegally entering the
country, conceals, attempts to conceal, or harbors an alien.
13. See supra note 4.
14. The INS is under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department and holds primary
responsibility for enforcing the civil and criminal provisions of the INA and IRCA. See 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982) (assigning the Attorney General responsibility for enforcing the
immigration laws and authorizing him to delegate "any of the duties and powers imposed on
him in this chapter").
15. Implicit in a line of Supreme Court decisions is the rule that local police may
apprehend and arrest individuals who perpetrate federal crimes. See Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 31 (1963) (application of the fourth amendment to the states "implied no total
obliteration of state laws relating to arrests and searches in favor of federal law"); Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958) ("[I]n the similar circumstance of an arrest for
violation of federal law by state peace officers ... the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant
is to be determined by reference to state law."); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589
(1948) (The validity of an arrest for a federal crime by state police officers is determined by
state law.). Because the INA does not expressly prohibit local enforcement, states maintain
that local police can arrest people suspected of violating the criminal immigration statutes. See
United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984) (Kansas state
police have general investigatory authority to inquire into immigration violations); Gonzales v.
City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussed in Section III(A)); People v. Barajas, 81
Cal. App. 3d 999, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1978) (discussed in Section III(A)); see also infra notes
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absence of a limitation, federal criminal law becomes the law of the
16

land and states are bound by the supremacy clause to enforce it.

Inherent in this rule is the notion that local enforcement of federal
criminal law effectuates federal policy. Indeed, the supremacy clause
does not bar state arrest of individuals who violate federal criminal
17
law for this very reason.
The passage of the IRCA accentuates the need to carefully analyze whether the states may play a role in formulating immigration
policy through the exercise of their power to arrest individuals committing federal crimes. This Comment takes the position that state
and local arrests for criminal immigration violations are likely to
thwart critical federal interests in the immigration context. Because
of the delicate interests involved, 18 and because the Constitution so
commands,' 9 immigration regulation must be uniform. Yet enforcement practices vary from state to state and among municipalities. 20
22-25 (discussing the interrelationship between state arrest statutes and the criminal
immigration statutes).
16. See Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (using supremacy clause
argument to justify local arrests for immigration violations). For the principle that, in the
absence of limitation, the supremacy clause binds the states to enforce federal law, see
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880) ("[I]t must always be borne in mind that the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the law of every
State as its own local laws and Constitution."). But see infra note 23 (suggesting that while the
supremacy clause grants state executive agents the power to enforce state law, it is not clear
that the clause requires them to execute federal law).
17. Perhaps because the answer seems obvious, the Supreme Court has never considered
whether local enforcement of federal criminal statutes is consistent with federal policy.
Supreme Court dictum, however, has described local enforcement as "federal-state
cooperation in the solution of crime." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961). This dictum
suggests that the Court has simply assumed that local enforcement is not a threat to the policy
interests underlying federal law. See generally cases cited supra note 15.
18. See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941) (treatment of foreign
nationals is "one of the most important and delicate of all international relationships").
The United States's relations with Mexico illustrate the sensitive nature of immigration
policy. Mexico has on a number of occasions expressed concern over the discriminatory
treatment of Mexican nationals by United States law enforcement officials. See Castaneda, A
Flawed Immigration Law, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1986, at A31, col. 2 (fearing that immigration
reform will exacerbate racist tendencies); Mexicans Expecting No Good of Immigration Law,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, at A22, col. 2 (new era of discrimination and mistreatment of
Mexicans at hands of authorities); Wall St. J., May 4, 1982, at 1, col. 3 (Mexico protests
roundup of illegal aliens, charging that diplomatic procedures were violated and that Mexicans
were pressured into accepting a precipitated exit).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
20. Although state statutes determine the scope of a state or local police officer's authority
to make arrests for federal crimes, see cases cited supra note 15, state warrantless arrest
statutes vary, particularly with regard to arrests for misdemeanors. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 836 (West 1968) (officer may arrest when he has reasonable cause to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a "public offense" in his presence); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1904 (1984) (arrest without warrant for a misdemeanor is lawful where officer has
reasonable ground to believe that arrestee has committed a misdemeanor in his presence or
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Although courts and the Department of Justice have indicated that
local police can apprehend persons suspected of criminal immigration
law violations, neither courts nor the executive branch have been consistent in this pronouncement.2 1 The authority to enforce the criminal
outside his presence if law enforcement officers of the state where the misdemeanor was
committed request an arrest and the accused will not be apprehended unless immediately
arrested); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (1981) (an arrest for a crime may be made without a
warrant if the offense is committed in the officer's presence or within his immediate knowledge
if the offender is endeavoring to escape, if the officer has probable cause to believe that an act of
family violence has been committed, or for any other cause if there is likely to be a failure of
justice); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 213 (West 1981) (officer can arrest without warrant
if he has reasonable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed a misdemeanor, although
not in the presence of the officer); MINN. STAT. § 629.34 (1985) (a peace officer can make an
arrest without warrant when a "public offense" has been committed or attempted in his
presence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103 (1986) (officer may, without a warrant, arrest a
person for a public offense committed or breach of peace threatened in his presence).
21. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and a California appellate
court have held that federal immigration statutes do not preempt state enforcement and that
state and local police can enforce the criminal immigration statutes where state law permits.
Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d
999, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1978). The Tenth Circuit stated even more expansively in dictum
that "a state trooper has general investigatory authority to inquire into possible immigration
violations." United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984).
Federal district courts in Arkansas and Washington, on the other hand, have permanently
enjoined local enforcement of the immigration laws. Vivanco-Zepeda v. Fish, No. C82-1199C
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 1984) (consent decree), reprinted in 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 103,

118-19 (1984); Nunez v. Sanders, No. PB-C-82-228 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 18, 1983) (consent
decree), reprinted in 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 334-36 (1984).

Not even the Zepeda and

Nunez consent decrees are consistent, however; the Nunez order appears directed toward
enjoining only local enforcement of the civil immigration statutes, see 61 INTERPRETER
RELEASES, at 335, while the Washington district court drafted its order more broadly. See 61
INTERPRETER RELEASES, at 118-19. The Zepeda defendants were enjoined from "stopping,
detaining, interrogating, holding or arresting [persons of hispanic or Mexican appearance] for
the purpose of ascertaining their immigration status or in any other way attempting to enforce
federal immigration laws." Id.
Justice Department vacillation on the enforcement issue may be attributable more to
political exigencies than uncertain legal footing. INS activities were hamstrung in 1983 and
1984 by an overwhelmingly negative reaction in communities with substantial alien
populations. In California's Silicon Valley, for instance, immigration raids by the INS caused
an uproar that forced the agency to beat a quick retreat. L.A. Daily J., Aug. 2, 1984, at 1, col.
6. The Reagan administration, coveting the Hispanic vote, decided that heavy-handed federal
enforcement tactics would not help its vote getting efforts. Id. An expanded state enforcement
role thus served to take the political pressure off the federal government. In 1983, then United
States Attorney General William French Smith announced a policy reversal opening
immigration enforcement to the states. See Justice Department Press Release, reported in 60
INTERPRETER RELEASES 172-73 (1983). The new policy called for "top priority to be given to

apprehending illegal aliens through cooperation with state and local authorities." See N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1983, at 14, col. 1.
Although congressional intent on the matter is far from clear, see infra notes 88 & 116,
Congress refused to openly embrace the administration's view. Republican Senator Charles
Grassley offered an amendment to the INA in 1982 that would have expressly permitted
independent local enforcement of the immigration laws. L.A. Daily J., Mar. 17, 1983, at 2,
col. 5. Congress rejected the Grassley amendment. Id.
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provisions, the scope of this authority, and the standards limiting
enforcement activity are unclear.
Moreover, a number of factors make state enforcement of the
criminal immigration laws haphazard. First, the states and the Justice Department maintain that state officials may exercise discretion
in arresting and detaining individuals suspected of violating criminal
immigration statutes.2 2 State and local governments have no duty to
enforce the immigration laws2 3 and, apparently, can choose whether
to cooperate with federal immigration officials.24 Second, police
22. The 1979 INS guidelines stated that "whether local or state law enforcement officers
have the legal authority to enforce the criminal provisions of the immigration laws is a
question of state law, since nothing in the Constitution or federal law prohibits such
enforcement." INS Guidelines M-69, at 40-41 (rev. June 1979). The 1983 revisions of these
guidelines encourage an even more active state and local police role in enforcing the criminal
immigration statutes. See Revised INS Guidelines, 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES 172-73
(1983). Importantly, the language in these revisions is permissive:
INS agents and local officers may also engage in joint operations which are
expected to uncover violations of both immigration and state laws....
In many
local jurisdictions, state law authorizes local officers to enforce the criminal
provisions of federal law, including criminal immigration provisions. Such
operations are conducted by local officers under their local authority and will not
be directed by the Service.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Note, Illegal Aliens and Enforcement: Present Practices and
Proposed Legislation, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 127, 149 (1975) ( "[T]he states maintain that the
silence of [the immigration statutes] gives them the discretion whether or not to enforce immigration statutes.").
23. In the absence of a limitation, the supremacy clause grants state and local law
enforcement officials the authority to enforce federal criminal statutes. See cases cited supra
note 15. It is not clear, on the other hand, that the clause requires state and local police to
execute federal law. The supremacy clause expressly imposes a duty to enforce federal laws
upon state judges, but makes no mention of state executive officers:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
In a nonbinding opinion, the California Attorney General determined that California
peace officers and judges have "no general legal duty.., to report knowledge they might have
about persons who have entered the U.S. by violating title 8 U.S.C § 1325." 67 Cal. Op. Att'y
Gen. 331 (1984). The opinion distinguished between "affirmative" duty and "nonimperative,"
or moral, duty. Id. at 333. Because no penalty arises from the failure to report criminal
immigration violations, the California Attorney General concluded that peace officers have no
general legal duty, in the sense of a positive obligation, to enforce the criminal immigration
statutes. Id.
24. See infra notes 27-28. Local governments may perceive enforcement of the
immigration laws as an unwanted burden for two reasons. Enforcement is expensive, and to
some, it is wrong. Enforcement of federal law by local governments means that those
governments must bear the cost of detaining and arresting undocumented aliens. One author
estimated in 1984 that the cost of detaining an illegal alien was forty to seventy dollars a day.
Harwood, supra note 8, at 517. Los Angeles administrators complain of spiraling criminal
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arrest upon reasonable suspicion.25 Yet because both civil and criminal immigration violations, with the exception of the smuggling statute, turn on alienage,2 6 probable cause to suspect criminal
immigration violations is difficult to distinguish from probable cause
justice costs and argue that the federal government should absorb the added expense of jailing
undocumented aliens, providing interpreters, and processing additional paperwork. See
SupervisorSays Undocumented Aliens StrainingCounty Jails, Courthouses, L.A. Daily J., Aug.
2, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
Although title V of the IRCA addresses state reimbursement, it does not reimburse the
states for the cost of detaining undocumented aliens for immigration violations. Title V
provides that "the attorney general shall reimburse a state for the costs incurred by the state
for the imprisonment of any illegal alien or Cuban national who is convicted of a felony by
such state." IRCA § 501(a). Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, who introduced title V as an
amendment to the IRCA, stated that Congress designed title V to reimburse states where there
was no adequate safeguard to protect them from large influxes of potential criminals.
D'Amato, Aliens in Prison-TheFederalResponse to New CriminalJustice Emergency, 4 DET.
C.L. REV. 1163, 1168 (1983). The Senator also noted that the incarceration of alien felons
who have been through some sort of immigration screening process does not trigger title V
reimbursement. See id. Senator D'Amato's comments suggest that title V contemplates
reimbursement for the incarceration of aliens convicted of felonies on independent state
grounds, not the detention of aliens for immigration violations.
Furthermore, a significant number of local governments resist immigration policy for
ideological reasons. Since 1980, a number of cities have passed resolutions declaring
themselves sanctuary cities in response to the efforts of private, generally church affiliated,
organizations assisting illegal aliens. Most of the sanctuary resolutions direct local authorities
to avoid cooperation with immigration officials unless required to do so by law or court
decision. For reprints of some of these resolutions, see 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 135-37
(1986) (Los Angeles, California and Seattle, Washington resolutions); 63 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 643-46 (1986) (resolution adopted by Oakland, California); 62 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 382-85 (1985) (Cambridge, Massachusetts resolution). For an analysis of the
sanctuary movement, see generally Ecumenical, Municipal and Legislative Challenges to
United States Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 495 (1986) [hereinafter Ecumenical
Challenges].
25. While it is not clear whether the supremacy clause requires state executive agents to
execute federal criminal law, see supra note 23, the clause does demand that state and local
police officers who choose to arrest for federal crimes do so within constitutional boundaries.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961) (federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime
under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their new mutual
obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches); cf Developments in
the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1372-84
(1983) (discussing the need for the INS, as a law enforcement agency, to remain within the
permissible bounds placed on police conduct and that fourth amendment prohibitions are
applicable to law enforcement activities even where directed toward the apprehension of
noncitizens).
26. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326, 1357(a) (1982); supra notes 9-12. As one author noted, an
INS agent must make two determinations before taking an alien into custody for an
immigration violation: alienage and deportability. Harwood, supra note 8, at 519. This
requirement arises from the fourth amendment's demand that searches and seizures be
"reasonable." See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975).
The same rule applies to state or local police officers, except that state and local police
must also distinguish between merely deportable aliens and aliens who have committed an
immigration misdemeanor or felony. Because the civil and criminal provisions overlap, all
aliens chargeable with a section 1325 or 1326 crime are also deportable. Not all deportable
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to suspect civil violations. 27 The power to apprehend criminal immigration violators is an effective carte blanche to apprehend persons
violating civil immigration statutes as well. Thus fourth amendment
constraints on police behavior do not ensure uniform or principled
local arrest procedures for violations of the criminal immigration
laws. Third, state arrest statutes must affirmatively permit enforcement of federal criminal law.28 Many do, but a number do not.29
Fourth, local rules regarding the apprehension or detention of
undocumented aliens are either nonexistent or ambiguous.3" Immigration law consequently becomes a tool in the hands of untrained
local law enforcement officials to treat minorities in a discriminatory
and nonuniform fashion.31
aliens, however, are in violation of criminal sections 1325 and 1326. See Harwood, supra note
8, at 511-12.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
28. See cases cited supra note 15 (state law determines the lawfulness of arrests for federal
crimes); see also Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e must
now consider whether state law grants Peoria police the affirmative authority to make arrests
under [the criminal provisions of the INA].").
Illegal entry is a misdemeanor under 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Because most encounters between
local police and undocumented aliens involve warrantless arrests, the officer's authority to
apprehend a section 1325 violator will turn on whether state arrest statutes permit an arrest for
a misdemeanor occurring outside the presence of the officer. A section 1325 misdemeanor is
completed at the time of entry, and therefore is not a "continuing" offense that occurs in the
presence of the arresting officer. United States v. Rincon-Jiminez, 595 F.2d 1192, 1194 (9th
Cir. 1979) (illegal entry is not a continuing offense that occurs in the presence of an arresting
officer).
29. Under the common law rule, an officer could execute a warrantless arrest for a
misdemeanor only when it was committed in the officer's presence. A number of states have
statutorily abrogated this rule. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 20.
30. See People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1016, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 212 (1978)
(Reynoso, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note 22 at 148.
31. See Sotomayor, PoliceAbuse.- The Most Volatile Issue, 13 PERSP. CiV. RTS. Q. 15-32
(1980) (describing abuse of Hispanics and undocumented aliens by local police); see also Dion,
And a Sweep in Utah, PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1986, at 18 (reporting abuses during a raid in
Wendover, Utah); Dubose, A Texas Roundup, PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1986, at 17. Affidavits filed
in a suit for damages and injunctive relief arising out of the Wendover raid stated that local
police jailed small children without diapers or food, deported a four-year-old without notifying
his parents, assaulted a woman trying to provide her husband's documentation, kicked in
doors at midnight shouting obscenities, and stopped people solely because they looked
Hispanic. See Affidavits for the Plaintiffs, Rodriguez v. INS, No. 86-C-0326J (D. Utah filed
April 17, 1986). In a letter to Interpreter Releases, counsel for the plaintiffs in Nunez v.
Sanders, No. PB-C-82-228 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 18, 1983), wrote:
As you are well aware, local police agencies frequently use the threat, and reality,
of arrest for alleged violations of the immigration laws in an attempt to
intimidate migrant farmworkers and other immigrant workers. All too often the
intimidation tactics are used to benefit employers. . . . [C]onditions for the
workers are abysmal. These conditions are enforced, in part, with the help of
local police agencies.
61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 334-35 (1984). As this letter indicates, undocumented aliens are
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In the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary, however, lower courts have refused to find that the congressional scheme
embodied in the INA preempts local enforcement of the federal immigration laws. This Comment attributes that result to the standards
defining federal preemption. Two of the tests for federal preemption
focus on congressional intent and presumptively favor concurrent
state activity. Although the third preemption standard is facially
attentive to federal purposes, it relies on the courts to identify those
purposes. The standard thus permits judicial discretion, and the two
courts confronted with the enforcement issue have consequently overlooked significant national interests. a2
Part II examines the preemption doctrine in relation to a state
activity-arrest of immigration law violators-that directly affects the
federal immigration power. 33 That section concludes that the preemption standards are insensitive to national interests in the immigration enforcement context because they neglect two important
factors-substance and impact. Part III asserts that states, by arresting individuals for immigration violations, directly regulate a substantive federal power. It then analyzes the two lower court decisions
addressing the state enforcement issue. Both of these opinions illustrate the insensitivity of preemption tests to federal interests in the
immigration enforcement context. Part III proposes a modified preemption standard that corrects the deficiencies of current preemption
tests. Finally, it concludes that federal law preempts state arrests for
violations of the criminal immigration statutes.
II.
Because its standards are rigorous,34 the preemption doctrine
often victims of crimes committed by law enforcement agencies and others who know of the
aliens' reluctance to seek justice at the risk of discovery and deportation. See also United
States v. Otherson, 637 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1980) (recounting the beating of an undocumented
alien by INS agents and comment by the defendant: "We find it necessary to do things like
this because the criminal justice system doesn't do anything to these assholes"); Developments
in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, supra note 25, at 1437.
Harassment by local police must particularly disgruntle Mexicans who enter the United
States legally, as many of them wait eight years or more to receive visas. Rout, For Most
Mexicans, Legal Entry is Impossible Dream, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1982, at 1, col. 4. American
embassy officials in Mexico describe long lines and years of patient waiting for visa applicants.
Id. Latin American Studies Professor Ronald Grennes, of Trinity University in San Antonio,
Texas, notes that "[iut is a mind-blowing event to try to come in legally .... [It is] miraculous
that they wait as long as they do." Id.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 99-119.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 34-81.
34. Unless Congress expressly states its intent to preempt state law, courts must determine
whether an inference of preemptive intent can be drawn from federal "occupation of the field"
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creates a presumption favoring state activity. Thus the doctrine protects power reserved to the states by the constitutional structure and
is an appropriate tool for the courts when the challenged action is
within the purview of "all other powers" not reserved to the federal
government. 35 A presumption favoring state law is not justified, however, when state activity directly interferes with the federal immigration authority.36 The Constitution reserves the immigration power to
the federal government, and this power should not fall to the states
absent express constitutional delegation. 37 Yet two courts mechani-

cally applying the preemption standards have concluded that federal
authority does not preempt a direct state regulation of immigration. 38
or whether state law conflicts with federal law or policy. See generally Note, The Burger
Court and the Preemption Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1233 (1985). The Supreme Court has stated that a hypothetical conflict will not preempt state
law; rather, the state action at issue must constitute "an irreconcilable conflict between federal
and state regulatory schemes." Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982). The
Court has also required a strict showing of federal occupation before it is willing to infer
preemptive intent. See text accompanying notes 56-59; see also Note, supra, at 1247
("Occupation of the field is the most comprehensive type of preemption and affords state law
little chance of survival. Accordingly, the Court has been hesitant to find that federal
legislation occupies the field."). Furthermore, the Court's focus on the comprehensiveness of
federal legislation with respect to the narrowpurpose of the state legislation at issue means that
parties challenging state legislation must meet an even stricter burden. See Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144-45 (1963) (Federal regulation of agricultural
picking and processing, "however comprehensive for those purposes . . . does not of itself
import displacement of state control over the distribution [of agricultural products]."). Thus
the evidence favoring preemption must be very clear, whether a party is claiming the support
of the express, inferred, or conflict standards. See generally Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (discussing express, inferred, and
conflict preemption); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. Bd., 467 U.S.
2518, 2523 (1984) (discussing express preemption); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 222-24 (1947) (same).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 39-81.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-68 (1941).
Justice Black, writing for the majority, observed
[T]he supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs,
including power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear
,by the Constitution.... Our system of government is such that the interest of
the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole
nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign
relations be left entirely free from local interference.
Id. at 62, 68 (emphasis added); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976) ("[I]t is the
business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of either the
states or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens.").
38. For a discussion of Gonzales v. City of Peoria and People v. Barajas, see infra Section
III(A). Although prior to the Supreme Court's decision in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351
(1976), a number of lower courts held that the federal immigration laws preempted state
legislation prohibiting the employment of undocumented aliens, this kind of state legislation is
an indirect, not a direct, regulation of immigration. See infra text accompanying notes 46-53.
See generally Nozewski Polish Style Meat Prods. v. Meskill, 376 F. Supp. 610 (D. Conn.
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This result is attributable to both the insensitivity of the preemption
doctrine to federal interests in the immigration context and the
courts' failure to distinguish between direct and indirect interference
with a substantive federal power.
The authority to directly regulate immigration should never fall
to the states absent express congressional delegation for three reasons.
First, the Constitution expressly places the power to regulate immigration in the hands of Congress. Article I charges Congress with the
duty "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization." 3 9 The framers
clearly intended the immigration power, like the foreign relations
power, to exclusively reside in the federal government.' Second, the
immigration power arises not only from article I, but also from an
extra-constitutional notion of sovereignty.4 1 As an incident of sovereignty, immigration affects the collective interests of all the states, not
matters concerning one state alone. Moreover, the treatment
accorded aliens in this country has significant international overtones.
The Supreme Court has therefore recognized that "immigration, naturalization, and deportation fall within the general field of foreign
affairs," and that "any concurrent state power that may exist is
restricted to the narrowest of limits." '4 2 Third, absent comprehensive
federal control, state regulation of immigration impairs national interests. The federal government has a paramount interest in the uniformity of the immigration laws.4 3 Yet state enforcement is far from
1974); De Canas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 351
(1976); Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal. App. 3d 673, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1974).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
40. "The powers [of the federal government] ... provide for the harmony and proper
intercourse among the states . . . to establish an uniform rule of naturalization .... The
dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization, has long been remarked as a fault in our system,
and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions." THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at
213-15 (J. Madison) (G. Wills ed. 1982). For further discussion concerning the danger of
permitting state action in matters relating to to foreign affairs, see generally THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 3, 4, 5, 80 (G. Willis ed. 1982).
41. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 & n.ll (1941); Eiku v. United States, 142
U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (The Chinese
Exclusion Case); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 189, 225 (1982) ("Drawing upon its [article 1,
§ 8] power, upon its plenary authority with respect to foreign relations and international
commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders, Congress has
developed a complex scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within our
borders." (emphasis added)); accord Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1982).
42. Hines, 312 U.S. at 68.
43. Although the Constitution's command that Congress establish a uniform rule of
naturalization is enough in itself to establish a national interest in uniform immigration policy,
uniformity is critical because of the relationship between immigration and foreign relations.
See U.S. CONST. art. 8, cl.4; see also cases cited supra note 37. Justice Miller, when
confronted with a California statute designed to prevent immigration by imposing penalties on
classes of travelers, cogently summarized the argument for uniform immigration laws: "If the
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uniform," and the constitutional
structure may render uniform state
5
4
enforcement an impossibility.

This is not to say that the preemption doctrine is an inappropri-

ate analytical tool when courts are confronted with a state exercise of
police power that indirectly infringes on federal immigration authority. Indeed, Supreme Court dictum has arguably attached some significance to a direct-indirect distinction. In De Canas v. Bica," the
Court examined a section of the California Labor Code prohibiting an
employer from knowingly hiring an alien who was not a lawful resident of the United States if such employment would have an adverse

effect on lawful resident workers. 47 Noting that states possess broad
authority under their police powers to regulate employment, the
Court concluded that federal law did not preempt state laws indirectly affecting immigration.48
[United States] should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension of
intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union?" Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S.
275, 279 (1875); see also supra text accompanying note 19.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31; see also Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d
468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1014, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 210
(1978) (Reynoso, J., dissenting); Benke, The Doctrine of Preemption and the Illegal Alien: A
Casefor State Regulation and a Uniform Preemption Theory, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 166, 172
(1975); Note, supra note 22, at 147-48.
45. See supra note 23. This Comment argues that a prohibition on state and local
enforcement of the criminal immigration statutes will protect the national interest in uniform
immigration policy. The reverse, however, would also achieve this end: Congress or the
courts could impose an affirmative duty on all of the states to enforce the immigration statutes
and could enact guidelines binding on all state and local governments sufficiently
comprehensive to control police discretion so that enforcement would be uniform.
This alternative, however, is not realistic, as it poses virtually insurmountable
implementation problems. Congress would either have to devise a sort of "super" agency to
oversee local enforcement or rely on current methods of assuring police compliance with arrest
and detention standards-the exclusionary rule and state law and federal statutes creating civil
causes of action against law enforcement officials who abuse their authority. But the
exclusionary rule and civil liability are designed to protect individual interests, not federal
interests. Additionally, the Supreme Court held in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings. 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
Moreover, undocumented aliens are unlikely to bring civil actions against law enforcement
officials because they risk exposure and deportation in so doing. See supra note 31.
46. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
47. Id. at 352-54.
48. Id. at 365. The Court stated that it "has never held that every state enactment which
in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se preempted by this
constitutional power, whether latent or exercised." Id. at 355. It went on to distinguish earlier
Supreme Court cases invalidating state regulations affecting aliens:
"[T]he fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a
regulation of immigration .... Indeed, there would have been no need, in cases
such as Graham, Takahashi, or Hines v. Davidowitz even to discuss the relevant
congressional enactments in finding preemption of state regulation if all state
regulation of aliens was ipso facto regulation of immigration ....
Id. (citations omitted).
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Language in De Canas suggests, however, that the Court would
have reached a different result had the state regulation directly
affected the federal immigration power: "The fact that aliens are the
subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration .... [E]ven if such local regulation has some purely speculative
and indirectimpact on immigration, it does not thereby become a constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration ....4 9 The Court,
in finding that federal law does not preempt state exercise of its traditional police powers indirectly affecting immigration, implied that a
direct regulation of immigration can exceed state authority.5" But it
was persuaded as much by the substance of the regulation as it was by
the regulation's impact. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
observed that a "regulation of immigration ... is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country,
and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain."5 He
went on to stress that California designed its statute to protect its
fiscal interests, workforce, and economy.52 Because these interests
were within the "main-stream of . . .police power regulation," the
statute was not a regulation of immigration.53
The De Canas opinion signaled the emergence of two factors in
the immigration context-substance and impact-that, if appreciated,
will inject sensitivity into preemption analysis. Courts addressing
direct interference with the substantive federal immigration power,
however, have failed to recognize the importance of the direct-indirect
distinction.5 4 This oversight may be attributable to the Court's failure
to indicate the doctrinal role that impact and substance are to play."
49. Id. at 355-56 (emphasis added).
50. But see Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights ofAliens, supra
note 25, at 1449 (suggesting that De Canas can be seen as a sub silentio attempt to define a
more expansive state role in controlling illegal immigration).
51. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.
52. Id. at 357. As one author noted, "[T]he complexity of the socioeconomic and political
context of immigration has made Congressional attempts to regulate the field difficult." Note,
Federalism and Undocumented Immigration, 1 LA RAZA L.J. 119 (1984). Only in recent
years, however, have congressional attempts to regulate immigration recognized the
socioeconomic forces within this country that draw undocumented aliens. See supra note 1
and accompanying text. Federal regulation of these forces means regulation of employment,
education, and welfare matters traditionally reserved to the states. See IRCA §§ 101-315
(1986); see also Note, supra, at 122 (describing "quasi-immigration" issues such as
employment, education, and social services that are particularly suited to state authority and
policy formulation).
53. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356.
54. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Barajas, 81 Cal.
App. 3d 999, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1978). Both cases are discussed in Section III(A).
55. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355-56. The subject matter of the state activity in question
clearly influences the Supreme Court's preemption analysis. See Note, supra note 34, at 1238
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's preemption tests do not lend themselves to a direct impact analysis.
Part of the blame lies with the preemption doctrine's emphasis
on congressional intent. The Supreme Court has identified three
types of preemption,5 6 and two of them turn on stringent tests for
intent." Express preemption occurs when Congress specifically states
in a federal statute that it intends to preempt state activity.5 8 Additionally, courts can infer preemptive intent from a pervasive regulatory scheme that evidences the "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress" to oust concurrent state action.5 9 A showing of direct
impact, not particularly germane to the quest for intent, will not preclude state action under either of these tests.
Nor have the courts been receptive to the direct-indirect distinction under the third preemption test-the conflict test.' This is true
even though conflict preemption, unlike the intent standards, focuses
on the effect of the state activity on federal interests. Under the conflict test, federal law preempts state regulation conflicting with a specific federal mandate or posing an obstacle to the accomplishment of
congressional purposes. 61 Courts must interpret the federal legisla(observing that the Burger Court was less willing to preempt state law when the subject matter
was local in nature); see also Note, A Frameworkfor Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363,
389 (1978) (concluding that the Court generally will not preempt state laws protecting "vital
state interests"). But subject matter in itself does not structure the Court's preemption
inquiry-this is left to the intent, occupation of the field, and conflict tests. In Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, for instance, the Court repeatedly reflected on the character of
a state statute regulating avocado production while pursuing its intent, occupation, and
conflict preemption inquiry. 373 U.S. 132, 143, 144, 146 (1963) ("the maturity of avocados
seems to be an inherently unlikely candidate for exclusive federal regulation"; "the maturity of
avocados is a subject matter of the kind this Court has traditionally regarded as properly
within the scope of state superintendence"; "a state regulation of this kind is an exercise of the
historic police powers of the States"). Similarly, substance-and impact-are strong currents
in De Canas. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355-56.
56. The three tests are express preemptive intent, pervasive federal scheme-from which
preemptive intent can be inferred-and conflict preemption. See Michigan Canners &
Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 466 (1984) (discussing express,
inferred, and conflict preemption); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141-46
(setting forth the strict preemptive intent test); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 499
(1956) (articulating the pervasive scheme test).
57. See supra note 34.
58. See, e.g., FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142.
59. Id.; see also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
2371, 2375 (1985) (intent to preempt may be inferred where federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for supplementary
state regulation).
60. See cases discussed infra Section III(A).
61. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (Virginia statute
limiting the rights of aliens to fish in state waters conflicted with federal statute granting
fishing licenses); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (conflict arose when state alien
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tion to ascertain its objectives and to determine whether state action
poses an obstacle to those objectives. Accordingly, the test permits
considerable discretion as courts are free to "select" congressional
goals.62

The conflict test is not inconsistent with a direct-indirect impact
inquiry in that both tests focus on the effect of state activity. The two
differ, however, in an important respect. The impact test is satisfied
upon a finding that state activity directly affects a substantive federal
concern while the conflict test requires that any effect, whether direct
or indirect, actually impair federal purposes. Unlike the impact test,
conflict preemption does not demand direct impact, and it does not
demand that state action affect an area of traditional federal concern.
The impact test thus assumes that state activity within a limited
sphere impairs federal purposes; the conflict test leaves this determination to the courts.
Courts charged with ascertaining legislative objectives under the
conflict test, however, are faced with a notoriously subjective task.63
The conflict test has no internal standards guiding judicial selection of
objectives. Moreover, the incidence of political compromise renders
registration law posed "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress").
62. See Note, supra note 34, at 1236. The authors observed that the "determination of
federal objectives permits room for judicial legislation, perhaps allowing a state law to operate
where Congress would have preempted it or vice versa." Id. at 1236 n. 19 (citing Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), as an
example of the Supreme Court's refusal to fill a legislative role).
63. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983). Professor
Easterbrook notes that
[i]f the question of a statute's domain may not often be resolved by reference to
the actual design, it may never properly be resolved by reference to imputed
design. To impute design to Congress is to engage in an act of construction....
If [even] powerful evidence of the intent of Congress about the domain of its
statutes is not dispositive in matters of construction . . . the usual kind of
evidence is even less helpful.
Id. at 537, 539; cf Brilmayer, InterestAnalysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 392, 399-40 (1980). The conflict preemption test is analogous to Professor Brainerd
Currie's choice of law theory, Interest Analysis, and is open to many of the criticisms leveled
at Currie's work. See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflicts of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171, 177-78 (The initial step in Interest Analysis is to determine whether a conflict
exists by examining the policies underlying the respective state laws.); see also Brilmayer, supra
(criticizing Interest Analysis for its assumption that courts can accurately ascertain legislative
intent). Both theories guide courts that must allocate power vis-a-vis competing sovereigns.
Indeed, the question of whether federal law preempts state law is very much like a choice of
law problem with constitutional rules-when Congress says so, federal law controls. But
unlike choice of law issues, the stakes are high in preemption cases because the ascendancy of
federal law extinguishes competing state activity. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
74 (1984) (Pennsylvania Registration Act preempted by federal law and therefore "[could] not
be enforced").
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this selection even more indeterminate. Even congressional inaction,
like that reflected in the state enforcement issue, is a product of politM To avoid cries
ical compromise."
of "judicial legislation," the
Supreme Court accordingly has opted for a result reminiscent of the
preemption intent tests in circumstances where the congressional purpose is not clear.65
In the absence of an actual conflict, courts are not willing to find
that state activity impairs federal purposes. Conflict preemption in
practice offers federal interests little more protection than that offered
by intent preemption. This result is disturbing in the immigration
context, where courts analyzing the constitutionality of state enforcement of the criminal immigration laws have overlooked the significance of substance and impact.66 The preemption doctrine as a result
has proved insensitive to paramount federal immigration interests. 67
This is particularly so in the case of local enforcement of the criminal
immigration laws, where state action directly implicates an area of
substantive federal concern.
III.
With enforcement of federal law and cooperation with federal
authorities its express goal, 68 state enforcement of the criminal immigration laws clearly has a direct impact on a substantive federal
power. The police officer on the street has considerable discretion and
makes federal immigration policy every time he stops, arrests, or
64. See Easterbrook, supra note 63 (positing a hypothetical of congressional inaction and
the difficulty of discerning legislative intent).
65. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 223 (1983) (realizing that it would end up performing a legislative role, the
Court refused to find that federal regulation preempted concurrent state activity); see also
supra note 62.
66. See cases discussed infra Section III(A).
67. But see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (state regulation that discriminates against
aliens is preempted if it imposes burdens not contemplated by Congress); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state welfare statute discriminating against aliens conflicted
with federal immigration policies). As Toll and Graham demonstrate, the Supreme Court has
used a light hand in applying the preemption standards to state legislation that discriminates
against aliens. Compare Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144-45
(1963) (under the inferred intent test, federal legislation preempts a concurrent state statute
only if the federal legislation is comprehensive as to the narrow objective of the state law) with
Graham, 403 U.S. at 377, 380 (state welfare statute conflicted with broad congressional intent
that aliens be accorded treatment equal to that received by citizens).
68. State arrests for federal crimes are conducted in the spirit of comity to prevent crime
and control society. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983)
("[Federal and local enforcement have identical purposes-the prevention of the
misdemeanor or felony of illegal entry."); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961)
(suggesting that states cooperate "in the solution of crime").
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ignores people who appear to be undocumented aliens. 69 As one California judge admonished, "[e]ffectuation of federal immigration policy is not a matter that can be left to the vagaries of state arrest and
detention law nor to the discretion of the local police officer."' 70 The
criminal immigration laws, which make undocumented entry and
harboring subject to criminal penalty, 7 have no state counterparts,
nor could states enact such laws if they so desired. 72 Criminal immigration law is an incident of sovereign power that has never been
reserved to the states.73
A.

Gonzales v. City of Peoria and People v. Barajas

A state district court and a federal court of appeals have nevertheless concluded that the INA does not preempt state enforcement of
the criminal immigration statutes. 74 Neither court attached significance to the De Canas direct-indirect distinction, and both opinions
demonstrate that the preemption standards-in creating a presumption favoring state activity and permitting courts to ignore federal
interests-are insensitive to critical national interests in the immigration context.
In Gonzales v. City of Peoria,75 eight Mexican nationals, two resi69. Most police departments vest considerable discretion with street-level officers in
deciding to make in-custody arrests. See Schubert, Police Policy and Rulemaking: The Need
for Definition, 9 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 261 (1981). Moreover, there is much variation in
defining police policy and considerable ambiguity as to persons vested with policymaking
authority regarding police operations. Id. at 262. Police officers and communities seem to
prefer the kind of "individualized" justice that is linked to police discretion. Steinman,
Managingand EvaluatingPolice Behavior, 14 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 285, 287 (1986). One
author goes so far as to state that "police supervision is a fiction." Kelling, On the
Accomplishments of the Police, in CONTROL IN THE POLICE ORGANIZATION 152, 160 (M.

Punch ed. 1983).
Because line officers have discretion, they develop informal norms to avoid procedures
and policies that they view as dysfunctional. Steinman, supra at 287. Furthermore, street
police tend to devote their limited resources to those activities viewed as important by their
communities. See Alpert & Dunham, Community Policing, 14 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 212,

220 (1986). Because communities vary tremendously in prioritizing apprehension of
undocumented aliens, see supra note 24, local enforcement of the immigration laws also varies
considerably at the street level. This variation is both attributable to and compounded by
society's ambivalent perception of the undocumented alien. As one journalist noted, even the
"government hasn't decided whether its on the side of the INS or the illegal immigrant."
Moffett, The Gatekeepers, Wall St. J., May 9, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
70. People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1016, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 212 (Reynoso, J.,
dissenting).
71. See supra notes 10-13.
72. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-68 (1941).
73. See supra notes 18, 39-42.
74. See Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App.
3d 999, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1978).
75. 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983).
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dent aliens, and one United States citizen sued for damages and
injunctive relief, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a city policy that
authorized its police officers to detain persons suspected of illegal
entry into the United States in violation of the INA. The Ninth Circuit held that federal law does not preclude local enforcement of the
criminal provisions of the INA.76 The court's reasoning is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it relied on the ability of local police to
distinguish between reasonable suspicion of a civil versus a criminal
violation to hold that federal law did not preempt local enforcement
of the criminal provisions of the INA. Second, it ignored the effect of
local enforcement on uniformity.
Initially, the court conceded that "substantial confusion" existed
as to the scope of the city policy." When first enunciated in 1978, the

policy indicated that "state law enforcement officers have the author76. Id. at 477. The Gonzales holding is not limited to the illegal entry provisions, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1325-1326. Compare Barajas, 81 Cal. App. at 1006, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 202 ("Since there is
no limitation relative to sections 1325 and 1326, the Lodi police officers had the power to
arrest for their violations.") with Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 475 ("We therefore hold that federal
law does not preclude local enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Act." (emphasis
added)). Gonzales, although a pre-IRCA case, raises the question of whether local police can
arrest employers subject to criminal penalty under the pattern or practice provision of the
IRCA. See IRCA § 274A(f)(l).
Like the illegal entry provisions, uniformity is an important federal interest underlying
section 274(A). See IRCA § 115 ("It is the sense of Congress that the immigration laws of the
United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly."). Unlike the illegal entry
provisions, however, the IRCA employer penalties overlap a sphere of traditional state
control-employment relations. See De Canas v. Bicas, 424 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1976)
(upholding state legislation that imposed penalties on employers who hired illegal aliens).
While the IRCA expressly preempts concurrent state legislation "imposing civil or criminal
sanctions . . . upon those who employ, or recruit . . . unauthorized aliens,"

IRCA

§ 274A(h)(2), it does not address state and local enforcement of the criminal employment
provisions. See generally IRCA tit. I, pt. A (making employment of unauthorized aliens
unlawful).
An analogous issue has arisen recently under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982), where state and local authorities have asserted the
authority to prosecute employers in criminal violation of section 666 of the Act. See Miami
Herald, Mar. 29, 1987, at 4C, col. 2 (reporting a comment by Kings County District Attorney
Elizabeth Holtzman that "state and local authorities must step in [to prosecute OSHA
violations] where the federal government has walked out"). One OSHA case, in which the
circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, sentenced three executives to jail in the cyanide
poisoning death of a worker, is being appealed on the basis that OSHA preempts local
prosecution. Id. at col. 4; cf.Five Migrant Farmworkers v. Hoffman, 136 N.J. Super. 242, 345
A.2d 378 (1975). In Five Migrant Farmworkers, the plaintiffs challenged state executive
inaction under a state statute mirroring OSHA provisions for the inspection of migrant labor
camps. The Superior Court of New Jersey held that "the State has neither the authority nor
the obligation to make inspections" because OSHA preempted the New Jersey statute
requiring occupancy inspections. Id. at 246, 345 A.2d at 382. Interestingly, the court
narrowly construed 29 U.S.C. 677(a), which reserves concurrent state authority under OSHA.
Id. at 244-45, 345 A.2d at 380-81.
77. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474.
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ity to make arrests for federal violations... [including] the authority
to take illegal aliens into custody. ' T8 The subsequent history of the
policy indicated that the Peoria police were unaware of definitions
and the nature of violations under the INA.7 9 Moreover, in 1979, the
department apparently reversed itself, issuing a memorandum that
directed "at no time will any Illegal Alien be arrested because he is an
Illegal Alien."'80 The city changed its policy again in 1982.81 An
operations order stated that officers were permitted to detain persons
suspected of illegal entry for a period "not to exceed twenty-four
hours, with the exception of weekends."8 2 Not surprisingly, the
officers testifying at trial were uncertain as to what the policies
permitted. 3
The court attributed this confusion to the police department's
failure to distinguish between civil and criminal violations of the INA,
noting that arrest of a person for civil violations would exceed the
authority granted city police by state law.8 4 Furthermore, the court
suggested that local officials correct the shortcoming by implementing
"refinements of both the written policies and officer training
programs." 5
Because it viewed the civil enforcement problem as curable, the
court considered only whether federal law preempted the city's limited claim of authority. 6 The court turned first to the conflict test
and concluded that state and federal enforcement have "identical purposes."8' 7 The city asserted only the power to enforce the criminal
provisions of the Act, and accordingly, "nothing inherent in th[e] specific enforcement activity . . . conflict[ed] with federal regulatory
interests."8 " The court also refused to infer preemptive intent from
78. Id. at 472 (quoting City of Peoria, Arizona, Police Department Memorandum (Jan. 9,

1978)).
79. Id. at 472-74.
80. Id. at 473 (quoting City of Peoria, Arizona, Police Department Memorandum (Jan. 9,

1978)).
81.
82.
1982)).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 473.
Id. (quoting City of Peoria, Arizona, Police Department Operations Order D-9 (Jan. 1,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 474.
at 476.
at 477.
at 474.

88. Id. at 475. Because Congress expressly authorized local enforcement of only the
harboring and smuggling statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) (1982), the Gonzales plaintiffs argued that

Congress's failure to expressly provide for local enforcement of illegal entry statutes, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1325-1326 (1982), evidenced its intent to withhold enforcement authority as to those two
sections. 722 F.2d at 475. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. Relying heavily on the
California appellate court's review in Barajasof the INA's legislative history, the court found
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the structure of the Act. The INA contained no express indication of
an intent to preempt local enforcement.8 9 Moreover, the criminal
provisions of the Act were few in number and were not "supported by
a complex administrative structure." 90 The court was therefore
unwilling to infer preemptive intent from federal occupation of the
immigration field.
The Gonzales court noted, however, that federal law does preempt local enforcement of the civil immigration statutes. The court
observed that the civil provisions constituted a system of federal regulation sufficiently pervasive to exclude state activity.91 Implicit in the
court's preemption analysis is the assumption that local police can
distinguish between civil and criminal provisions of the INA.
Because police act upon probable cause, the court's reasoning also
assumes that law enforcement officials can distinguish between the
probable cause to suspect a criminal immigration violation and the
probable cause to suspect a civil immigration violation.
Such a distinction is illusory at best. Most of the civil provisions
have criminal counterparts. 92 An alien who is "illegally present"
under section 1325, for example, is committing a civil violation of the
immigration laws. 93 On the other hand, an alien who illegally enters
the country commits a misdemeanor. 94 Both aliens will nevertheless
lack proper documentation. Both may appear to be foreign nationals.
Both may even admit illegal presence. While alienage and lack of
identification alone are not enough to create a reasonable suspicion of
illegal entry, 95 the arresting officer need only have some "additional
evidence" of a criminal violation. 96 The additional factors are highly
subjective. Officers rely on behavioral traits, clothing, or their own
that a compromise amendment striking the words "of the United States," so that all officers

have authority to arrest for 1324(c) violations, could not be read as an implied limitation on
sections 1325 and 1326. Id. (citing S. CONF. REP. No. 1505, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin
1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1358, 1360-61). Instead, the court concluded that
the 1324(c) amendment "implicitly made the enforcement authority as to all three identical."

Id.
89. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 475.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 476.
92. Harwood, supra note 8, at 512.
93. 8 U.S.C. 1357(a) (1982).
94. 8 U.S.C. 1325 (1982).
95. The Gonzales court attempted to distinguish the probable cause to suspect a civil as
opposed to a criminal immigration violation, stating that "although the lack of documentation
or other admission of illegal presence may be some indication of illegal entry, it does not,
without more, provide probable cause of the criminal violation of illegal entry." 722 F.2d at
476-77 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 477; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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experience. 97 Because it is easy to argue after the fact that an alien's
glance was furtive, this ephemeral probable cause standard results in
what field officers describe as "canned p.c."'98 Furthermore, these factors, resting as they do on the alien's unconscious betrayal of his own
wrongful activity, do not distinguish between civil and criminal violations of the INA. An alien who is illegally present is no less likely to
anticipate trouble at the appearance of an officer than an alien who
has illegally entered the country.
The Gonzales court's failure to recognize the impracticability of a
civil-criminal distinction, however, does not render its intent preemption analysis meritless. The distinction is logical in theory and may be
useful for focusing on congressional intent. Nevertheless, the practical difficulty of distinguishing between civil and criminal probable
cause should have alerted the court to the weakness of its conflict
preemption analysis. Instead, the Ninth Circuit used the civil-criminal distinction to maneuver its conflict inquiry along an overly narrow
path. Concluding that local and federal enforcement of the criminal
statutes served "identical purposes," 99 and that local police could cure
haphazard enforcement by training police to distinguish between civil
and criminal immigration violations, 10° the court dismissed-or
ignored-the federal interest in uniform enforcement of the immigration laws. 10 '
Because it lacks guidelines for identifying congressional objectives and state consistency with those objectives, the conflict test is
open to Gonzales-like judicial gerrymandering. The Constitution
expressly embraces a national interest in uniform immigration policy. 102 Despite this express objective, the court avoided analyzing the
effect of state and local arrests of immigration violators on uniform
enforcement of the immigration laws. Thus the conflict preemption
test, because it is devoid of standards, invites courts to ignore federal
interests.
97. See Harwood, supra note 8, at 531 (describing routine INS immigration law
enforcement practices observed by the author). The author notes that
it is easy to come up with the necessary articulable facts after the fact. When this
occurs it is referred to as "canned p.c." (probable cause). Who is to say if a
glance was furtive and who is to judge whether the clothing an individual was
wearing was Mexican? Any strenuous effort by the courts to properly enforce the

reasonable suspicion standard would probably come to naught.
Id. at 531-32.
98. Id.
99. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474.
100. Id. at 477.
101. Id.
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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The Ninth Circuit, however, is not the only court that has been
insensitive to the federal interests at stake when local police arrest
03
undocumented aliens. In People v. Barajas,1
a California appellate
court similarly held that federal law does not preempt local arrests for
criminal immigration violations. Two local police officers arrested the
defendant, an undocumented alien, on independent state grounds.
The defendant Barajas claimed to have a "green card" but was unable
to produce it. Furthermore, he gave the officers a false name and was
unable to tell them where he lived. 1°4 Although the police released
Barajas after arresting him for possession of a knife and narcotics,
they contacted an INS officer and described the defendant's "vital statistics."1 °5 Convinced that Barajas was a repeat illegal entry offender
and therefore was violating section 1326 of the INA, 11 6 the INS
officer asked the local police to arrest Barajas. The police arrested the
defendant near a bar and found contraband in his pocket. 107 A jury
subsequently convicted Barajas for possession of heroin.
The defendant contended on appeal that the local police did not
have authority to make arrests for violations of the INA illegal entry
statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325-1326.108 Beginning with a search for congressional intent in the history of the Act, the court found that Congress did not intend to preclude local arrests for violations of the
immigration laws. 109 The court's analysis resembled an intent preemption inquiry, but the court did not expressly state that it was
engaged in preemption analysis.1° Nor did it consider federal objectives and the possibility of a federal and state conflict. Instead, the
court simply stated that "the supremacy clause is a two-edged sword,
and in the absence of a limitation, the states are bound by it to enforce
violations of the federal immigration laws." '1 Because the INA contained no limitations, the court held that local police had the power to
arrest Barajas for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326.112
Its reliance on the supremacy clause indicates that the court was
aware that it was confronted with a preemption issue. Nevertheless,
the court's abbreviated preemption analysis suggests that it was
uncertain of the correct legal rules applicable to local arrest for immi103. 81 Cal. App. 3d 999, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1978).

104. Id. at 1003, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.

108. Id. at 1004, 147 Cal Rptr. at 198.
109. Id. at 1005-06, 147 Cal Rptr. at 198.

110. See id., 147 Cal Rptr. at 198-99.
111. Id. at 1006, 147 Cal Rptr. at 199.
112. Id.
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gration law infringements. Preemption issues typically deal with concurrent state legislation.III Because law enforcement is an arm of the
executive branch, local police arrests for federal law violations present
an unusual preemption question." 4 The State of California did not
pass a statute that encroached on federal territory; its agents merely
arrested an individual suspected of violating a federal law.
Thus doctrinal confusion may explain the Barajas court's failure
to apply the conflict preemption test. The court appeared to conclude
that arrests for violations of federal law-which, it assumed,
advanced federal interests-need only survive an analysis of congressional intent. But courts cannot assume that local enforcement
advances federal interests simply because it purports to advance federal interests. Given the importance of uniformity in the immigration
context, such an assumption is unwarranted. Moreover, it bows to
state authority at the expense of national concerns, even though the
state's interest is limited.I 5
Barajas also demonstrates the inadequacy of the intent preemption tests where state action directly affects a substantive federal concern. As did the Ninth Circuit in Gonzales, the court found no
indication of congressional intent sufficiently specific to preclude local
arrests for immigration violations in the INA or its history.' 16 It conceded, however, that sections of the Act constrain the INS' power to
arrest without mention of a commensurate limit on state and local
police authority." 7 Local enforcement would accordingly permit
113. Consider, for example, the Burger Court's conflict preemption cases. All involved a

conflict with state legislative action. See, e.g., Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v.
Agricultural Mktg. Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984) (Michigan Agricultural Marketing and
Bargaining Act); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (California Franchise
Investment Law); Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7 (1983) (Hawaii statute
taxing airline income); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (New York Human Rights
Law); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (university policy); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982) (Illinois Business Takeover Act).
114. See supra note 68.
115. But cf Ecumenical Challenges,supra note 24, at 591-92 (arguing that federal law does
not preempt city sanctuary resolutions-which discourage local police enforcement of the
immigration laws-because the resolutions primarily serve the state's interest in ensuring
public health and safety by removing the fear of deportation and thus encouraging aliens to
report crimes).
116. Barajas,81 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
117. Id. Under one section of the INA, an INS officer's authority is more limited than that
of other law enforcement officials. Amended section 1357 of the INA abrogates the open fields
doctrine with regard to INS raids of farms and other outdoor business operations. IRCA
§ 116 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1982)). Because the open fields doctrine allows any other
law enforcement official to enter outdoor farming operations without a warrant, state
enforcement in this instance would circumvent section 1357's restriction on INS powers, a
result certainly not contemplated by Congress. Under section 1357(a)(1), however, an INS
officer's power is more expansive than that traditionally accorded local authorities because of
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police to circumvent the Act's restrictions on INS arrest powers, a
result that Congress surely did not intend. 118 Faithful to the strict
intent demanded by the intent preemption tests, however, the court
responded with a verbal shrug: "There are reasons why Congress
might choose to limit local enforcement . . .but Congress has not
done so."'"19
Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the California appellate court considered the factors suggested by the Supreme Court in De Canassubstance and impact. Moreover, because the three preemption tests
are insensitive to federal interests when a state directly regulates a
substantive federal concern, both courts applying those tests failed to
recognize that local enforcement threatens uniform immigration policy. The opinions demonstrate that the preemption tests are inadequate for two reasons. First, the intent tests create a presumption
favoring state authority, and second, the conflict test hands courts the
discretion to choose objectives. The following section proposes a remedy for these preemption test flaws that presumes a threat to national
interests where courts find a direct state regulation of immigration.
B.

A Modified Preemption Standard

The preemption doctrine protects the states' interests in exercising powers reserved to them in the tenth amendment by demanding
that courts strictly construe congressional intent. Thus the doctrine
will not allow ambiguous assertions of federal "occupation" to prethe specialized training that the immigration officers receive. See United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 n.3 (1976). Although immigration violations are inextricably bound
to a standard (alienage) that in any other context would be constitutionally unacceptable, an
INS officer has the authority under section 1357(a)(1) to "interrogate any alien" and request
proof of legal presence. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1982).
Section 1357 of the INA appears to grant INS officers the authority to interrogate on the
basis of the mere belief that the subject is an alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1982) (providing
that INS officers may, without a warrant, "interrogate any alien or person believed to be an
alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States"). The courts have not agreed on
whether merely a reasonable suspicion of alienage, as opposed to illegal alienage, justifies a
section 1357 interrogation. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 n.9 (1975).
In either case, the INS officer's authority exceeds that of a state law enforcement officer. For
an excellent analysis of constitutional limits on the INS's authority to interrogate and detain
aliens, see Note, The Immigration and Naturalization Service and Racially Motivated
Questioning.- Does Equal Protection Pick Up Where the Fourth Amendment Left Off?, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1986).
118. The Barajasdefendant argued that permitting local police officers to make warrantless
arrests for immigration violations undermines the congressional warrant policy expressed in
section 1357 of the INA. See 8 USC § 1357(a) (1982) (describing limited circumstances in
which an immigration officer or employee can arrest without warrant). In theory, federal
officials could avoid the warrant requirement by simply asking local police to make arrests for
them. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
119. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
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clude state regulation of a field in which the states have a constitutional interest. The Gonzales and Barajas courts were unable to
discern any specific indication of preemptive intent in the INA and its
history, and the intent preemption standards bound both courts to
hold that local law enforcement officers can arrest persons suspected
of violating the criminal immigration statutes. This is so even though
the states' goal was to effectuate a federal purpose-a purpose not
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. Moreover, the conflict
test, which purports to entertain federal interests but provides no
guidelines for so doing, permitted the Gonzales court to select one
interest and ignore all others. All three preemption tests accordingly
permitted Arizona and California to encroach directly on an extraconstitutional federal power even though the states' own interests
were limited.
Gonzales and Barajas demonstrate the insensitivity of the preemption standards to national interests when the state action at issue
directly affects an incident of the federal sovereign power. Uniformity
is critical to the exercise of sovereign authority. For this reason, the
framers reserved the sovereign powers to Congress and not to the
states. They recognized that, without such a reservation, each state
would be free to create its own immigration and foreign relations policy. Indeed, state enforcement of the criminal immigration statutes
embodies the framers' fears: its result is the cacophony of a thousand
local governments making immigration policy. In holding that local
police have the authority to make arrests for immigration violations,
both courts ignored the significance of uniformity.
Because of the sensitive nature of the immigration power, state
arrests for immigration crimes should only be permitted where there
is express congressional indication that they may do so. Accordingly,
this section proposes a test that permits courts to infer preemptive
intent where sensitive extra-constitutional interests are at stake. To
protect the constitutional balance of state and federal power, however,
this test requires a narrow predicate: the court must determine that
first, the state action directly affects the federal immigration power;
second, the power affected is an incident of sovereign authority; and
third, the state action primarily serves interests reserved to the federal
government.
This substance-impact test does not displace the intent tests, but
operates in union with them. In contrast to the conflict test, however,
the impact-substance inquiry does not ask courts to identify federal
objectives and then determine whether state activity hinders those
objectives. As Gonzales demonstrates, this discretion allows courts to
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the impact-substance test

presumes that a direct regulation of federal immigration power harms
important national concerns. The test therefore forces courts to protect national interests when the states have no independent and primary police power interest.
IV.

CONCLUSION

State and local law enforcement officials should not have the
authority to stop, detain, interrogate, or arrest individuals solely on
suspicion of an immigration violation. Unlike state and local enforcement of other federal criminal statutes, local arrests for immigration
violations do not necessarily effectuate federal policy. Moreover,
courts analyzing the state enforcement issue have failed to recognize
that state and local arrests for immigration violations hinder the federal interest in uniform immigration enforcement. The modification
of the preemption standards suggested above would force courts to
respond to national interests in the immigration context. But whether
such a modification is practicable or not, the INA, and indeed the
supremacy clause itself, should be construed to prohibit state and
local arrests of undocumented aliens.
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